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Developing countriesPolicymakers in resource-rich developing countries often face complicated ﬁscal choices to manage natural re-
source revenues. While investing resource revenues in public capital may promote economic growth, spending
without saving or borrowing against future revenues can expose the economy to debt sustainability risks. This
paper presents the Debt, Investment, Growth, and Natural Resources (DIGNAR) model for analyzing the macro-
economic and debt sustainability effects of scaling up public investment in resource-rich developing countries. It
captures pervasive problems of these countries thatmay be aggravated during scaling-ups, including investment
inefﬁciency and limited absorptive capacity. It also allows for ﬂexible ﬁscal speciﬁcations: investment can be
jointly ﬁnanced by resource revenues and debt; a resource fundmay be used as a buffer; and distorting ﬁscal ad-
justments are subject to feasibility constraints. The application to an average low-income country shows that,
when ﬁscal adjustment is implementable, a delinked public investment approach combined with the resource
fund – such that government spending is a-cyclical with respect to resource revenues – can reduce macroeco-
nomic instability relative to a spend-as-you-go approach. However, even with the fund, ambitious frontloading
public investment plans combinedwith more borrowing can induce debt sustainability risks, especially with de-
clining investment efﬁciency or when future resource revenues turn out to be lower than expected.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Public investment scaling-ups offer many opportunities as well as
challenges to countries endowed with natural resources. They may
raise important concerns, for instance, about their macroeconomic and
ﬁscal implications for the economy, which may be compounded in
resource-rich developing countries that also face the challenge of man-
aging their natural resource wealth. To analyze these implications in a
coherent framework is not an easy task. This paper constructs a small
open economymodel, in the tradition of the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) literature, to assess the macroeconomic and ﬁscalDepartment for International
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pressed here are those of the
IMF, IMF policy, or DFID. The
amil Dybczak, Stephen G. Hall
oers, Catherine Pattillo, four
nference, University of Oxford,
g, 80424 Taiwan, R.O.C.
@mail.nsysu.edu.tw
. This is an open access article undereffects of public investment surges in resource-rich developing coun-
tries, including the effects on growth and debt sustainability.
In theory, by ﬁnancing public investments in infrastructure and
human capital, natural resource revenues may help foster development
and growth in many developing countries. Increases in public capital
may raise the productivity of labor and private capital, inducing more
accumulation of these productive factors and, therefore, growth — the
positive productivity and cost-saving effects described by Agénor
(2012).1 In addition, resource revenues can serve as collateral for bor-
rowing from internationalmarkets,making it possible to build uppublic
capital even before these revenues actually arrive. And by providing this
external ﬁnancing, resource revenues may help smooth away the
crowding out effects on private consumption and investment that are
claimed to be part of public investment increases, particularly when
these increases depend somewhat on domestic ﬁnancing. Through
smoothing these crowding out effects, resource revenues then also sup-
port the positive public investment growth nexus.1 Berg et al. (2010) refers also to a “Dutch vigor” effect, in which higher public capital
can generate positive learning-by-doing externalities that increase total factor productiv-
ity and growth.
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to developing countries. One of them is the natural resource curse:
resource-rich countries often face lower growth rates than those of
non-resource-rich counterparts (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995,
1999; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; van der Ploeg, 2011; Satti
et al., 2014).2 As history reveals, several reasons may explain this
curse, including the volatility of commodity prices combined with mis-
management of debt and public investment. Manzano and Rigobon
(2007) point out that excessive borrowing in the 1970s predicated on
the belief of a continuous rising path of oil prices led to inevitable debt
crises and lackluster growth in the 1980s, when oil prices plummeted.
This was evident in Latin America, where the region witnessed a “lost
decade” despite the undertaking of ambitious investment projects
(Gelb, 1988; Carrasco, 1999). These effects were probably aggravated
by problems of declining public investment efﬁciency and limited ab-
sorptive capacity (van der Ploeg, 2012; Berg et al., 2013). In fact, as sug-
gested by Warner (2014), these problems may be behind the weak
empirical link between public investment surges and growth in devel-
oping countries.
As more developing countries continue to discover and exploit nat-
ural resources and remain committed to scale up public investment to
achieve the sustainable development goals, the need to assess the po-
tential macroeconomic effects of public investment surges in
resource-rich developing countries has become more prominent for
policymakers. Country teams at the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), for instance, are frequently asked to provide suchmacroeconom-
ic assessments, including on debt sustainability. In some cases, resource
revenues are expected to come in the future and therefore the ambi-
tious public investment plans involve substantial borrowing in the
present. To do these assessments, teams can rely on model-based
frameworks such as the Debt, Investment and Growth (DIG)model, de-
veloped in Bufﬁe et al. (2012), and the Natural Resource (NR) model,
described in Berg et al. (2013).3 TheDIGmodelmakes explicit the public
investment-growth nexus and allows for different debt ﬁnancing
schemes. However, it does not have a natural resource sector and
models resource revenues as a foreign transfer, such as aid. Meanwhile,
the NRmodel contains a resource sector and features different resource
management policies, but it does not allow for borrowing to ﬁnance in-
vestment spending. For countries that intend toﬁnance investment pro-
jects with both resource revenue and debt, neither model seems
adequate.4
In this paper, we ﬁll the modeling gap by combining the models de-
veloped in Bufﬁe et al. (2012) and Berg et al. (2013) into a suitable
framework for assessing debt sustainability and growth beneﬁts of pub-
lic investment surges in resource-rich developing countries.We name it
theDebt, Investment, Growth, andNatural Resources (DIGNAR)model.
It differs from the DIG model by adding a natural resource sector so it
can account for resourceGDP and distinguish between the resource sec-
tor and the non-resource traded good sector. Also, it differs from the NR
model by including a variety of debt instruments — concessional debt,
external commercial debt, and domestic debt. Moreover, DIGNAR in-
cludes several important economic features of developing countries,
namely learning-by-doing externalities in the traded good sector to cap-
ture potential Dutch disease effects from spending resource revenues,2 Despite the concern of the resource curse, resource revenues have played an impor-
tant role in supporting public investment spending and economic growth in many devel-
oping countries, as documented in Hamdi and Sbia (2013) for Bahrain and Dizaji (2014)
for Iran.
3 The DIGmodel was developed to address criticisms on the IMF-World Bank debt sus-
tainability framework (DSF, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2005). This
framework does not make explicit the link between public investment and growth and
has often been criticized for its incoherence inmaking debt projections, which leads to po-
tential biases toward conservative borrowing limits (Eaton, 2002; Hjertholm, 2003).
4 In addition tomicro-foundedmodels, there also existmacroeconomicmodelswithout
optimizing behaviors for assessing the growth effects of investing resource revenues. See
Ali and Harvie (2013) for studying oil revenues and economic development in Libya as an
example.public investment inefﬁciencies, limited absorptive capacity constraints,
and a time-varying depreciation rate of public capital, which can acceler-
ate when maintenance is not sufﬁcient to replenish depreciated capital.
Since the natural resource literature highlights the importance of
savings in managing volatile resource revenues (e.g., Collier et al.,
2010; van der Ploeg, 2010a; Van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013)
and many developing and more developed countries, such as
Kazakhstan (Minasyan and Yang, 2013) and Kuwait (Mehrara and
Oskoui, 2007), have beneﬁted from setting up a stabilization or saving
fund, DIGNAR includes a resource fund that serves as a ﬁscal buffer.
For given paths of public investment, aid, resource prices and quantities,
a resource fund is drawn down to cover a revenue shortfall or accumu-
lates savings from excessive revenues.5 In practice, some countries may
borrow externally while saving resource revenues at the same time, de-
spite that the interest earned from a resource fund is often lower than
the interest cost of borrowing. To accommodate this phenomenon in
DIGNAR, the government can borrow before exhausting the resource
fund by imposing a minimal saving level in the fund. Public debt accu-
mulation then triggers distorting ﬁscal adjustments via changes in
taxes or in government transfers to households.
After presenting themodel, the paper illustrates howDIGNAR can be
used to derive policy lessons by relying on some stylized experiments.
We calibrate the model to an average low-income developing country
and analyze various investment scaling-up paths. Two hypothetical sce-
narios of resource revenue paths are constructed: one that represents
the baseline scenario resembling the qualitative patterns of a country
that anticipates a future resource windfall; and the other one, referred
to as the adverse scenario, where the baseline is affected by large nega-
tive revenue shocks. The investment approaches simulated are (i) the
spend-as-you-go (SAYG) approach, which invests all resource windfall
each periodwithout saving, and (ii) the delinked approach, which com-
bines investment and saving such that government spending is a-
cyclical with respect to resource revenues.
Several policy lessons are obtained from the simulation results. First,
when ﬁscal adjustment is implementable, the delinked investment ap-
proach combinedwith the resource fund can reducemacroeconomic in-
stability, while the SAYG approachmay aggravate it. This holds for both
scenarios of resource revenues, including the adverse one. A delinked
approach delivers a more resilient and stable growth in non-resource
GDP and a less volatile real exchange rate. The novelty of this result
lies on showing the key role that pervasive features of developing coun-
tries – such as limited absorptive capacity, declining public investment
efﬁciency, and learning-by-doing externalities – play in amplifying the
macroeconomic instability effects of the SAYG approach. Under this ap-
proach, sudden accelerations in public investment expenditures make
the economy more prone to bumping into absorptive capacity con-
straints, translating into a declining efﬁciency for public investment.
Moreover, the substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate in-
duced by the SAYG approach leads to greater negative learning-by-
doing externalities and thus a larger decline in traded output —
i.e., more severe Dutch disease effects. With the delinked investment
approach combinedwith the resource fund, these negative effects, how-
ever, are contained.
The second lesson is that, when ﬁscal adjustment is constrained (or
cannot be implemented beyond certain magnitudes in tax increases or
spending cuts) and borrowing is necessary to ﬁll ﬁnancing gaps, a
front-loaded public investment surge, even if coupled with a resource
fund, can induce debt sustainability risks. Simulations for different de-
grees of investment front-loading, declines in investment efﬁciency,
paths of resource revenues and returns to capital are conducted to
show their importance for debt sustainability problems.6 Given the5 This differs from Berg et al. (2013), where the saving rate of a resource windfall into a
resource fund is constant, an unrealistic feature compared to the operation of a resource
fund in reality.
6 For country applications of DIGNAR, see, for example, Minasyan and Yang (2013),
Melina and Xiong (2014), and Deléchat et al. (2015).
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revenues, we also investigate how various assumptions on the persis-
tence of learning-by-doing externalities affect these effects. Moreover,
we explore whether the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisﬁed in our
model by studying how the real appreciation from investing resource
revenues affects traded good output and the trade balance.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature on managing re-
source revenues for developing countries. This literature has evolved
from advising to save most of a resource windfall in a sovereign wealth
fund, as suggested by the permanent income hypothesis (e.g., Davis
et al., 2001; Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Bems and de Carvalho Filho,
2011), to recommending to invest the windfall to build productive cap-
ital (e.g., van der Ploeg, 2010b; Venables, 2010; van der Ploeg and
Venables, 2011; Araujo et al., 2013). To complement this literature,
our paper offers a policy tool for assessing the macroeconomic and
debt sustainability effects associated with different revenue scenarios
and investment trajectories, without necessarily looking at optimal
policies.7 Like other DSGE models developed for policy analysis,
DIGNAR is an internally consistent framework that can be used to sys-
tematically produce alternative macroeconomic and policy scenarios,
making explicit its different assumptions as well and their implications
for macroeconomic outcomes (Berg et al., 2015c). In this regard,
DIGNAR offers a framework for organizing thinking and informing pol-
icy decisions.
2. The DIGNAR model
We ﬁrst give a non-technical overview of the model and then pro-
ceed to provide the full model speciﬁcation.
2.1. An Overview
DIGNAR is a real model of a small open economy with two types of
households and three production sectors. The intertemporal optimizing
households have access to capital andﬁnancialmarkets, and the rule-of-
thumb households are poor and ﬁnancially constrained, consuming all
the disposable income each period. The three production sectors in-
clude a nontraded good sector, a (non-resource) traded good sector,
and a natural resource sector. Since resource-rich developing countries
tend to export most resource output, we assume that the whole re-
source output is exported. Also, as most natural resource production is
capital intensive, and much of the investment in the resource sector in
developing countries is ﬁnanced by foreign direct investment, natural
resource production in the model, both resource quantities and prices
are assumed to follow exogenous processes to match the projected re-
source output and prices.
Each period the government's total receipts consist of i) taxes, in-
cluding consumption taxes, labor income taxes, and resource revenues,
ii) foreign aid, iii) bond sales, iv) the principal and interest earnings
from the resource fund, and v) user fees on infrastructure services.
The government's total expenditures consist of i) government con-
sumption, ii) public investment, iii) transfers to households, iv) debt
service payments, and v) savings in the resource fund.
The highlight of the ﬁscal speciﬁcation is the inclusion of a resource
fund –which can be used to save resourcewealth and help smooth gov-
ernment spending – combined with different ﬁscal adjustment instru-
ments and types of borrowing. In simple words, given exogenous
paths of resource revenues and public investment – as well as steady-
state values for other ﬁscal variables – any ﬁscal surpluses are accumu-
lated in the fund. When negative resource revenue shocks hit (from7 Regarding optimal public investment policies, see Levine et al. (2015).unexpected low production or prices), the fund can be drawn down to
support pre-determined government spending levels. In the case that
the fund does not have sufﬁcient savings to cover revenue shortfalls
(or reaches a minimal level that the government prefers to maintain),
the government resorts to borrowing. As in Bufﬁe et al. (2012), borrow-
ing can be done through issuing domestic debt, external commercial
debt, and external concessional debt. Depending on the borrowing
choice, domestic and external commercial debt accumulates endoge-
nously while the path of external concessional debt is taken exogenous-
ly because the latter is decided by international donors. Public debt
accumulation then triggers distorting ﬁscal adjustments via the con-
sumption and labor income tax rates, government consumption, or
transfers to households. When the model-implied ﬁscal adjustments
are deemed too large to be implementable, DIGNAR can impose con-
straints on an upper bound for a tax rate or a lower bound for govern-
ment consumption and transfers, yielding a debt trajectory in line
with more realistic ﬁscal adjustments.8
The key investment-growth link in DIGNAR is that public investment
creates productive capital, which enters the production functions of trad-
ed and nontraded goods. Public investment, however, is subject to some
investment inefﬁciency and absorptive capacity constraints. Hulten
(1996) andPritchett (2000) argue that high productivity of infrastructure
can often coexist with very low returns on public investment in develop-
ing countries, because of investment inefﬁciencies thatmay be associated
with corruption, among other things. As a result, all public investment
spending does not necessarily increase the stock of productive capital.
Similarly, absorptive capacity constraints related to administrative and
management capacity and supply bottlenecks –which negatively affect
project selection, management, and implementation, and raise input
costs – can further reduce the efﬁciency of public investment and have
negative effects on growth, as suggested by Esfahani and Ramirez (2003).
2.2. Model speciﬁcation
We denote variables associated with intertemporal optimizing
households by the superscript OPT and the rule-of-thumb households
by the superscript ROT. Also, we denote variables associated with the
traded, nontraded goods, and resource sector by T,N, andO, respectively.
2.2.1. Households
A fractionω of the households are intertemporal optimizing and the
remaining fraction 1− ω are rule-of-thumb. Both types of households
consume a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) basket (cti) of trad-
ed goods (cT,ti ) and nontraded goods (cN,ti ). Thus,
cit ¼ φ
1
χ ciN;t
 χ−1
χ þ 1−φð Þ1χ ciT ;t
 χ−1
χ
  χ
χ−1
; for i ¼ OPT;ROT; ð1Þ
where φ indicates the nontraded good bias and χ N 0 is the intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution. The consumption basket is the
numeraire of the economy, with the unit price of this basket corre-
sponding to
1 ¼ φp1−χN;t þ 1−φð Þs1−χt
h i 1
1−χ
; ð2Þ
where pN,t and st represent the relative prices of nontraded and traded
goods, respectively. Assuming that the law of one price holds for traded
goods implies that st also corresponds to the real exchange rate, deﬁned
as the price of one unit of foreign consumption basket in units of domes-
tic basket.8 Tomaintainminimal functions, government consumption cannot be lowered than the
level required to cover its operating costs, and transfers cannot be lower than zero.
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tion basket Eq. (1) yields the following demand functions for each good:
ciN;t ¼ φ pN;t
 −χcit and ciT;t ¼ 1−φð Þ stð Þ−χcit ∀i ¼ OPT;ROT: ð3Þ
Both types of households provide labor service (LT,ti and LN,ti , i =
OPT, ROT) to the traded and nontraded good sectors, denoted by sub-
script T and N, respectively. Total labor Lti has the following CES speciﬁ-
cation to capture imperfect substitutability between the two types of
labor:
Lit ¼ δ−
1
ρ LiN;t
 1þρ
ρ þ 1−δð Þ−1ρ LiT;t
 1þρ
ρ
  ρ1þρ
; for i ¼ OPT;ROT; ð4Þ
where δ is the steady-state share of labor in the nontraded good sector,
and ρ N 0 is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution. LetwT,t andwN,t
be the real wage rates paid in each sector. The real wage index is
wt ¼ δw1þρN;t þ 1−δð Þw1þρT ;t
h i 1
1þρ
: ð5Þ
A representative optimizing household maximizes the expected
discounted value of its utility ﬂows from consuming and working
E0
X∞
t¼0
βtU cOPTt ; L
OPT
t
 
¼ E0
X∞
t¼0
βt
1
1−σ
cOPTt
 1−σ
−
KOPT
1þ ψ L
OPT
t
 1þψ" #( )
;
ð6Þ
9
subject to the budget constraint:
1þ τCt
 
cOPTt þ bOPTt −stbOPTt ¼ 1−τLt
 
wtL
OPT
t þ Rt−1bOPTt−1−Rt−1stbOPTt−1
þΩT ;t þΩN;t þ ϑKτK rKT;tkT;t−1 þ rKN;tkN;t−1
 
þ strmt
þzt−μkG;t−1−ΘOPTt :
ð7Þ
E0 is the expectation operator at time 0; β≡[(1+ ρ)]−1 is the subjec-
tive discount factor; and ϱ is the pure rate of time preference.σ is the in-
verse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and
Ψ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of the
labor supply. κOPT is the disutility weight of labor, and τtC and τtL are the
tax rates on consumption and labor income. The intertemporal optimiz-
ing households have access to government bonds btOPT that pay a gross
real interest rate Rt. They can also borrow from abroad btOPT ⁎ at the inter-
est rate Rt⁎ that pays a constant premium u over the interest rate that the
government pays on external commercial debt Rdc,t, such that
Rt ¼ Rdc;t þ u: ð8Þ
These households also receive proﬁts, ΩT,t and ΩN,t,
from ﬁrms in the traded and nontraded good sectors. The term
ϑKτK(rT,tK kT,t − 1 + rN,tK kN,t − 1) is a tax rebate that optimizing house-
holds receive on the tax levied on the ﬁrms' capital return.10 rmt⁎9 For the sake of simplicity, our model speciﬁcation assumes that government con-
sumption does not enter the household's utility function. Instead, it can affect households'
utility indirectly through responses in private consumption and labor due to changes in
public investment or government consumption. An alternative speciﬁcation that allows
government spending to generate utility directly is to replace ctOPT with ~c
OPT
t ≡
½aðcOPTt Þ
v−1
v þ ð1−aÞðgCt Þ
v−1
v 
v
v−1
, where gtC is government consumption, a is theweight of pri-
vate consumption in utility, and v controls the substitutability or complementarity be-
tween the two.
10 Because of the common wedge between tax burden imposed and tax revenues ac-
crued to the government in developing countries, we assume that a fraction ϑK of the
tax revenue related to capital income does not enter the government budget constraint.
Introducing thiswedge also allows us tomatch the observed initial lowprivate investment
ﬂows observed in most of these countries.denotes remittances from abroad, and zt is government transfers.
μkG,t − 1 is the user fees charged for public capital services, and
ΘOPTt ≡
η
2 ðbOPTt −bOPTÞ
2
is portfolio adjustment costs associated
with foreign liabilities, where η controls the degree of capital ac-
count openness, and bOPT ⁎ is the initial steady-state value of pri-
vate foreign debt.11
Rule-of-thumb households have the same utility function as that of
intertemporal optimizing households, so
U cROTt ; L
ROT
t
 
¼ 1
1−σ
cROTt
 1−σ
−
κROT
1þ ψ L
ROT
t
 1þψ
: ð9Þ
Their consumption is determined by the budget constraint
1þ τCt
 
cROTt ¼ 1−τLt
 
wtL
ROT
t þ strmt þ zt−μkG;t−1; ð10Þ
while static maximization of the utility function gives the following
labor supply function:
LROTt ¼
1
κROT
1−τLt
1þ τCt
cROTt
 −σ
wt
 1
ψ
: ð11Þ
2.2.2. Firms
Nontraded good ﬁrms produce output yN,twith the following Cobb–
Douglas technology:
yN;t ¼ zN kN;t−1
 1−αN LN;t αN kG;t−1 αG ; ð12Þ
where zN is total factor productivity, kN,t − 1 and kG,t − 1 are private and
public capital used at t,αN is the labor share of sectoral income, andαG is
the output elasticity with respect to public capital.
Private capital installed in the nontraded good sector evolves ac-
cording to
kN;t ¼ 1−δNð ÞkN;t−1 þ 1− κN2
iN;t
iN;t−1
−1
 	2" #
iN;t ; ð13Þ
where iN,t represents investment expenditure, δN is the capital depreci-
ation rate, κN is the investment adjustment cost parameter, and kG,t is in-
frastructure. The investment adjustment costs follow the representation
suggested by Christiano et al. (2005).
The representative nontraded good ﬁrm maximizes its
discounted lifetime proﬁts weighted by the marginal utility of con-
sumption of the intertemporal optimizing households λt. These
proﬁts are given by
ΩN;0 ¼ E0
X∞
t¼0
βtλt pN;tyN;t−wN;tLN;t−iN;t−τ
KrKN;tkN;t−1
 
; ð14Þ
where rKN;t ¼ ð1−αNÞpN;t
yN;t
kN;t−1
is the (gross) return to capital.11 According to Schindler (2009), measures of de jure restrictions on cross-border ﬁnan-
cial transactions suggest that the private capital account for the median sub-Saharan
African country – a typical low-income country – is relatively closed. Therefore, to capture
this, we assume that intertemporally optimizing households face portfolio adjustment
costs associatedwith foreign assets/liabilities. These adjustment costs also ensure station-
arity in this small open economymodel, as discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
Note that a variable without a time subscript refers to the steady-state value of such
variable.
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sector produce traded output with the following technology
yT;t ¼ zT ;t kT;t−1
 1−αN LT;t αN kG;t−1 αG : ð15Þ
To capture the commonDutchdisease effects associatedwith spend-
ing resource revenues, we assume that the total factor productivity in
this sector, zT,t, is subject to learning-by-doing externalities:
zT;t
zT
¼ zT ;t−1
zT
 	ρzT yT ;t−1
yT
 	ρyT
; ð16Þ
where ρzT ;ρyT ∈ [0, 1] control the severity of Dutch disease. This speciﬁ-
cation is a variation of the one in Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992),
Torvik (2001), and Adam and Bevan (2006).12WhenρzT orρyTb 1, there
is no permanent effect of learning by doing on productivity or output,
but deviations of traded sector output from the trend can have some
persistent productivity effects.
Private capital in the traded sectors is accumulated according to
kT;t ¼ 1−δTð ÞkT;t−1 þ 1− κT2
iT;t
iT;t−1
−1
 	2" #
iT;t : ð17Þ
Like nontraded good ﬁrms, a representative traded good ﬁrm maxi-
mizes the following discounted lifetime proﬁts:
ΩT;0 ¼ E0
X∞
t¼0
βtλt styT ;t−wT;tLT;t−iT;t−τ
KrKT;tkT;t−1
 
: ð18Þ
Resource production and prices follow exogenous processes.13 The
model can incorporate any exogenous path for these production and
prices, but also allows for a simple parametric representation of the fol-
lowing types. For resource production, we assume
~yO;t
~yO
¼
~yO;t−1
~yO
 	ρyo
exp εyot
 
; ð19Þ
whereρyo∈ (0, 1) is an auto-regressive coefﬁcient andε
yo
t  iid Nð0;σ2yoÞ
is a production shock. For the international commodity price (relative to
the foreign consumption basket), we assume
pO;t
pO
¼ p

O;t−1
pO
 	ρpo
exp εpot
 
; ð20Þ
where ρpo∈ (0, 1] is an auto-regressive coefﬁcient andε
po
t  iid Nð0;σ2poÞ
is a price shock. We assume that resource production is small relative to
world production; hence, the country cannot control p⁎O,t.12 Aside from assuming learning-by-doing with respect to total factor productivity, the
literature has alternative approaches to modeling learning-by-doing. Chang et al. (2002)
assume that labor skill depends on the hours worked last period. Cooper and Johri
(2002) and Johri and Lahiri (2008) assume that organization capital (proxied by experi-
ence) depends on production levels of the same and similar goods. Also, Stokke (2008)
models learning-by-doing through sectoral labor shares in both traded and nontraded
goods sectors.
13 Resource production in reality is not exogenous to country authorities' decisions but
we abstract from modeling them. This is not very restrictive in the case of LIDCs. In fact,
in these countries, these decisions typically happen via negotiations between govern-
ments and foreignmultinational corporations. As such, one could think of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) as the outcome of these negotiations. Then FDI is accumulated to create
capital ktO, which in turn is used for resource production ytO= f(ktO). From this perspective,
there is no substantial value added from explicitly modeling this mechanism— one could
assume that either FDI or ytO is exogenous without any repercussions. For introducing en-
dogenous resource production, which seems more relevant for advanced economies, see,
e.g., Ferrero and Seneca (2015) where the representative resource producer uses a domes-
tic intermediate good.Resource GDP in units of the domestic consumption basket corre-
sponds to
yO;t ¼ stpO;t~yO;t : ð21Þ
The total real GDP yt in this economy is deﬁned as
yt ¼ pN;tyN;t þ styT;t þ yO;t : ð22Þ
2.2.3. The government
The government ﬂow budget constraint is given by
τCt ct þ τLtwtLt þ 1−ϑK
 
τK rKT;tkT;t−1 þ rKN;tkN;t−1
 
þ stgrt
þ μkG;t−1 þ tOt þ bt þ stdt þ stdc;t þ stRRF f t−1
¼ pGt gCt þ gIt
 þ zt þ Rt−1bt−1 þ stRddt−1 þ stRdc;t−1dc;t−1 þ st f t :
ð23Þ
Besides the tax revenues from consumption, labor income and capi-
tal income – τtCct, τtLwtLt, and∑j= T,N(1−ϑK) τKrj,tKkj,t− 1 – the govern-
ment also receives international grants, grt⁎, user fees, μkG,t − 1, and
resource-related royalties, ttO. As in Bufﬁe et al. (2012), the user fee
charged on public capital is computed as a fraction f of recurrent costs:
μ≡ fpGδG. The resource revenues collected each period are computed
as
tOt ¼ τOstpO;t~yO;t ; ð24Þ
where τO is a constant royalty rate that can be made time-varying, if
necessary. The government has three debt instruments: external
concessional debt, dt, external commercial debt, dc,t, and domestic
debt, bt. Concessional loans extended by ofﬁcial creditors are taken
as exogenous in themodel and charge a constant (gross) real interest
rate Rd. The gross real interest rates paid on external commercial
debt, on the other hand, incorporates a risk premium depending on
the deviations of total external public debt to GDP ratio from its ini-
tial steady state. That is
Rdc;t ¼ Rf þ υdc exp ηdc
st dt þ dc;t
 
yt
−
s dþ dcð Þ
y
 	 
; ð25Þ
where Rf is a (constant) risk-free world interest rate, and υdc and ηdc
are structural parameters. We now proceed to describe the govern-
ment spending variables and the resource fund in (23).
Government purchases comprise government consumption (gtC)
and public investment (gtI).14 Like private consumption, government
expenditure, gt≡gtC + gtI, is also a CES aggregate of domestic traded
goods, gT,t, and domestic nontraded goods, gN,t. Thus,
gt ¼ ν
1
χ
t gN;t
 χ−1
χ þ 1−νtð Þ
1
χ gT;t
 χ−1
χ
  χ
χ−1
; ð26Þ
where νt is the weight given to nontraded goods in government pur-
chases. We assume that government purchases have the same intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution χ N 0 as that of private consumption,
but different degrees of home bias (νt ≠ φ in Eq. (1)).14 Expenditures on government consumption implicitly include wage spending on pub-
lic employment, which generally accounts for half of government consumption expendi-
tures. To formally model the effects of government expenditures on public employment,
one should introduce public-sector wages and labor, and their interaction with private-
sector wages and labor. Since our focus is on the use of a resource windfall for scaling up
public investment, we abstract from the details of modeling public employment and its
effects.
16 To guarantee that the resource fund does not follow an explosive process, we assume
that in the very long run, a small autoregressive coefﬁcient ρ ∈ (0, 1) is attached to
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subject to the government consumption basket (26), yields the follow-
ing public demand functions for each good:
gN;t ¼ νt
pN;t
pGt
 	−χ
gt and gT ;t ¼ 1−νtð Þ
st
pGt
 	−χ
gt ; ð27Þ
where ptG is the government consumption price index in terms of units
of the consumption basket:
pGt ¼ νtp1−χN þ 1−νtð Þs1−χt
h i 1
1−χ
: ð28Þ
Note that νt is time-varying. As we focus on the effects of additional
government spending in the form of public investment, the weight
given to nontraded goods for the additional government spending, νg,
can differ from its steady-state value, ν. Thus,
νt ¼
pGg
 
ν þ pGt gt−pGg
 
νg
pGt gt
: ð29Þ
To reﬂect public inefﬁciencies and absorptive capacity constraints,
we assume that effective investment ~gIt is a function of the proportional
deviation of public investment from its steady-state value, γGIt ≡
gIt
gI −1,
and a threshold γGI . Speciﬁcally,
~gIt ¼
ϵgIt ; if γ
GI
t ≤ γ
GI
ϵ 1þ γGI
 
gI þ ϵ γGIt
 
γGIt −γ
GI
 
gI ; if γGIt N γ
GI
( )
; ð30Þ
where ϵ ∈½0;1 represents steady-state efﬁciency and ϵðγGIt Þ∈ð0;1 gov-
erns the efﬁciency of the portion of public investment exceeding the
threshold γGI , following:
ϵ γGIt
 
¼ exp −ςϵ γGIt −γGI
 h i
ϵ: ð31Þ
This captures the fact that, because of absorptive capacity con-
straints, the efﬁciency of that part of public investment exceeding the
threshold drops proportionally to the magnitude of the scaling-up. In
simple words, if the government invests too fast, it may face substantial
declines in efﬁciency because of the limited absorptive capacity as
discussed in policy circles. The severity of these constraints, and thus
the extent of the drop, is governed by parameter ςϵ ∈ [0, ∞).
The law of motion of public capital is described as
kG;t ¼ 1−δG;t
 
kG;t−1 þ ~gIt ; ð32Þ
where δG,t is a time-varying depreciation rate of public capital in the
spirit of Rioja (2003). Since insufﬁcient maintenance can shorten the
life of existing capital, we assume that the depreciation rate increases
proportionally to the extent towhich effective investment fails tomain-
tain existing capital.15 Speciﬁcally,
δG;t ¼
ϕδG
δGkG;t−1
~gIt
; if ~gIt b δGkG;t−1
ρδδG;t−1 þ 1−ρδð ÞδG; if ~gIt ≥ δGkG;t−1
8><
>:
9>=
>;; ð33Þ
where δG is the steady-state depreciation rate, ϕ ≥ 0 determines the ex-
tent to which poor maintenance produces additional depreciation, and
ρδ ∈ [0, 1) controls the persistence.
We introduce a resource fund in the model along the lines of Berg
et al. (2013). A resource windfall is deﬁned as resource revenues that15 Adam and Bevan (2014) ﬁnd that accounting for the operations and maintenance ex-
penditures of installed capital is crucial for assessing the growth effects and debt sustain-
ability of a public investment scaling-up.are above their initial steady-state level, i.e., ttO− tO. Let ft⁎ be the foreign
ﬁnancial asset in a resource fund. Each period, the resource fund earns
interest income st(Rrf − 1)ft − 1⁎ , with a constant gross real interest
rate Rrf. The resource fund evolves by the process
f t− f
 ¼ max f floor− f ; f t−1− f 
 þ f in;t
st
−
f out;t
st

 
; ð34Þ
where fin,t and fout,t represent the total ﬁscal inﬂow and outﬂow that we
deﬁne below. fﬂoor ≥ 0 is a lower bound for the fund that the government
chooses to maintain. If no minimum savings are required in a resource
fund, the lower bound can be set at zero. At each period, if the ﬁscal in-
ﬂow exceeds the ﬁscal outﬂow, the value of the resource fund
increases.16 Instead, if the resource fund is above fﬂoor, any ﬁscal outﬂow
that exceeds the ﬁscal inﬂow is absorbed by a withdrawal from the
fund. As we discuss below, whenever the ﬂoor of a resource fund
binds, potential ﬁscal gaps can be covered via borrowing and/or ﬁscal
adjustment. This adjustment, in turn, is achieved by increasing taxes
(on consumption and factor incomes) or by cutting government non-
capital expenditures (government consumption and transfers).
One of thepurposes of themodel is to analyze the effects of investing
a resource windfall. The simulations presented in this paper focus on
two investing approaches: the spend-as-you-go approach and the
delinked investing approach.17 These approaches are formulated as
follows.
• Spend-as-you-go approach (SAYG). With spend-as-you-go, the re-
source fund stays at its initial level (ft⁎= f*,∀ t), and the entire wind-
fall is spent on public investment projects:
pGt g
I
t−p
GgI ¼ t
O
t
st
−
tO
s
 	
: ð35Þ
• A delinked investment approach. With delinked investing, a scaling-
up path of public investment is speciﬁed as a second-order delay
function,
gIt
gI
¼ 1þ 1þ exp −k1tð Þ−2exp −k2tð Þ½ gInss; ð36Þ
where gnssI is the scaling-up investment target expressed as percent-
age deviation from the initial steady state, k1 N 0 represents the
speed of adjustment of public investment to the new level, and
k2 ≥ k1 represents the degree of investment frontloading. In particular,
if k1= k2=0, public investment stays at its original steady-state level,
i.e., gtI = gI ∀ t. If instead k1→ ∞, public investment jumps to the new
steady-state level immediately. Lastly, if k2= k1, public investment in-
creases gradually and is not frontloaded. The mechanics of this func-
tional form on public investment trajectories are illustrated in Figs. 1
and 2.
We borrow the structure of the ﬁscal gap and the mechanisms to
cover it, from Bufﬁe et al. (2012), but expand the number of ﬁscal in-
struments and take into account the dynamics of the fund. Given the
paths of public investment, concessional borrowing, and foreign grants,
algebraic manipulation of the budget constraint of the government
Eq. (23) allows us to rewrite it as follows:
gapt ¼ f out;t− f in;t þ st f t− f t−1
 
; ð37Þf
(ft− 1⁎ − f *). Themodel is typically solved at a yearly frequency for a 1000-period horizon.
The coefﬁcient ρf is activated after the ﬁrst 100 years of simulations.
17 In addition to the two approaches simulated here, the model allows for analyzing an
exogenously speciﬁed public investment path proposed by the user of the model.
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Fig. 1. Different speeds of investment scaling-ups. X-axis is in years.
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gapt ¼ Δbt þ stΔdc;t þ τCt−τC
 
ct
þ τLt−τL
 
wtLt−pGt g
C
t−g
C − zt−zð Þ ; ð38Þ
f in;t ¼ τCct þ τLwtLt þ 1−ϑK
 
τK rKT;tkT;t−1 þ rKN;tkN;t−1
 
þ tOt þ μkG;t−1
þstgrt þ st RRF−1
 
f t−1 þ stΔdt ;
ð39Þ
and
f out;t ¼ pGt gIt þ pGt gC þ zþ Rd−1ð Þstdt−1 þ Rdc;t−1−1
 
stdc;t−1
þ Rt−1−1ð Þbt−1: ð40Þ
Eq. (38) says that covering the ﬁscal gap entails domestic and/or ex-
ternal commercial borrowing or adjustments in various ﬁscal instru-
ments. By combining Eqs. (34) and (37), we can see that if ft⁎ N fﬂoor,
then gapt=0; i.e., the resource fund absorbs any ﬁscal gap and no ﬁscal
policy adjustments are needed. On the other hand, when ft⁎= fﬂoor, the0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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Fig. 2. Different degrees of frontloading in investment scaling-ups. X-axis is in years.gap satisﬁes gapt N 0 and it needs to be covered bymore borrowing and/
or by ﬁscal adjustments, as we proceed to explain.
The split of government borrowing between domestic and external
commercial debt, to help cover the gap, is determined based on the sim-
ple rule:
ϰΔbt ¼ 1−ϰð ÞstΔdc;t ; ð41Þ
where ϰ ∈ [0, 1]. This rule accommodates the limiting cases of
supplementing concessional loans and grants with only domestic bor-
rowing (ϰ= 0) or with only external commercial borrowing (ϰ= 1).
Debt sustainability requires that eventually revenues have to in-
crease and/or expenditures have to be cut to cover the gap. The debt sta-
bilizing target values of (i) the consumption tax rate, (ii) the labor
income tax rate, (iii) government consumption, and (iv) transfers are
determined by:
τCtarget;t ¼ τC þ λ1
gapt
ct
; ð42Þ
τLtarget;t ¼ τL þ λ2
gapt
wtLt
; ð43Þ
gCtarget;t ¼ g þ λ3
gapt
pGt
; ð44Þ
and
ztarget;t ¼ zþ λ4gapt ; ð45Þ
where λi, i=1,…, 4 split the ﬁscal burden across the different ﬁscal in-
struments, satisfying∑i = 14 λi=1. Tax rates and expenditure items are
then determined according to the policy reaction functions
τCt ¼ min τCrule;t ; τCceiling
n o
; ð46Þ
τLt ¼ min τLrule;t ; τLceiling
n o
; ð47Þ
gCt
gC
¼ max
gCrule;t
gC
; gCfloor
( )
; ð48Þ
and
zt
z
¼ max zrule;t
z
; zfloor

 
; ð49Þ
where τceilingC and τceilingL are themaximum levels of the tax rates that can
be implemented, and gﬂoorC and zﬂoor areminimumdeviations of govern-
ment consumption and transfer from their initial steady-state values.
All these ceilings and ﬂoors are set exogenously and reﬂect policy
adjustment constraints that governments may face. Finally, τrule,tC , τrule,tL ,
grule,t
C , and zrule,t follow the linear rules.
τCrule;t ¼ τCt−1 þ ζ1 τCtarget;t−τCt−1
 
þ ζ2 xt−1−xð Þ; with ζ1; ζ2N0;
ð50Þ
τLrule;t ¼ τLt−1 þ ζ3 τLtarget;t−τLt−1
 
þ ζ4 xt−1−xð Þ; with ζ3; ζ4N0;
ð51Þ
gCrule;t
gC
¼ g
C
t−1
gC
þ ζ5
gCtarget;t−g
C
t−1
 
gC
−ζ6 xt−1−xð Þ; with ζ5; ζ6 N0;
ð52Þ
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zrule;t
z
¼ zt−1
z
þ ζ7
ztarget;t−zt−1
 
z
−ζ8 xt−1−xð Þ; with ζ7; ζ8N0; ð53Þ
where ζ's control the speed of ﬁscal adjustments, and xt≡
btþstdc;t
yt
is the
sum of domestic and external commercial debt as a share of GDP.
2.2.4. Identities and market clearing conditions
To close themodel, the goodsmarket clearing condition and the bal-
ance of payment conditions are imposed. Themarket clearing condition
for nontraded goods is
yN;t ¼ φp−χN;t ct þ iN;t þ iT ;t
 þ νt pN;tpGt
 	−χ
gt ; ð54Þ
while the balance of payment condition corresponds to
cadt
st
¼ grt−Δ f t þ Δdt þ Δdc;t þ Δbt− 1−τ0
 
y0;t ; ð55Þ
where catd is the current account deﬁcit deﬁned as
cadt ¼ ct þ iN;t þ iT;t þ pGt gt þ ΘOPTt −yt−strmt þ Rd−1ð Þstdt−1
þ Rdc;t−1−1
 
stdc;t−1 þ Rt−1−1
 
stb

t−1− R
RF−1
 
st f

t−1:
ð56Þ
Given model complexity, Table 1 gives a list of variable deﬁnitions.
3. Calibration
The model is calibrated, at the annual frequency, to an average low-
income developing country (LIDC) that just starts exploitation of lique-
ﬁed natural gas (LNG). Other types of commodities and other stages of
exploitations can be accommodated by imposing an exogenous pathTable 1
Variables in the model.
Variable Description
ct
i Total consumption by household's type i
cj,t
i Consumption of good j by household's type i
pN Relative price of nontradables
st Real exchange rate
Lj,t
i Labor supply by household's type i to sector j
Lt
i Total labor supply by household's type i
wt Average real wage
wj,t Real wage paid in sector j
bt
OPT Government bonds (held by optimizers)
bt
OPT ⁎ Foreign domestic debt (held by optimizers)
τtC Consumption tax rate
τtL Labor income tax rate
Rt Domestic real interest rate
Rt⁎ Foreign real interest rate
Rdc,t Concessional real interest rate
Ωj,t Proﬁts in sector j
rj,t
K Real return of capital in sector j
kj,t Private capital in sector j
rmt⁎ Remittances
zt Government transfers
kG,t Public capital
ΘtOPT Portfolio adjustment costs
yj,t Output in sector j
Lj,t Labor in sector j
ij,t Private investment in sector j
zT,t TFP in tradables
ỹO,t Value of resource production
pO,t⁎ Relative price of natural resources
yO,t Production of natural resources
i= OPT, ROT.
j= T, N.of resource quantities and prices. Table 2 summarizes the baseline cali-
bration, explained below.
• National accounting. Our calibration largely reﬂects LIDC averages of
the last decade in the IMF World Economic Outlook database. The
trade balance is set at 6% of GDP, government consumption and public
investment are set at 14 and 6% of GDP, respectively, and private in-
vestment is set at 15% of GDP. We choose the shares of traded goods
to be 50% in private consumption and 40% in government purchases,
as government consumption typically has a larger component of
nontraded goods than private consumption. Since the economy is at
the early stages of exploitation, the share of natural resources is as-
sumed to be only 1% of GDP at the initial steady state.
• Assets, debt and grants. We assume that government savings are
small initially, only 1% of GDP (RFshare=0.01). For government do-
mestic debt, concessional debt and grants, we rely on LIDC aver-
ages of the last decade as in Bufﬁe et al. (2012). This implies
bshare = 0.20, dshare = 0.50, and grshare = 0.04. To highlight the ﬁ-
nancial constraints faced by LIDCs in international capital markets,
we set b⁎share = 0 and dc,share = 0.
• Interest rates. We set the subjective discount rate ρ such that the
real annual interest rate on domestic debt (R− 1) is 10%. Consis-
tent with stylized facts, domestic debt is assumed to bemore costly
than external commercial debt. We ﬁx the real annual risk-free in-
terest rate (Rf − 1) at 4%. The premium parameter υdc is chosen
such that the real interest rate on external commercial debt
(Rdc − 1) is 6%, and the real interest rate paid on concessional
loans (Rd− 1) is 0%, as in Bufﬁe et al. (2012). We assume no addi-
tional risk premium in the baseline calibration, implying ηdc = 0.
The parameter u is chosen to have R = R* in the steady state, re-
quired by Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5). Based on the average real return
of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund from 1997 to 2011
(Gros and Mayer, 2012), the annual real return on international ﬁ-
nancial assets in the resource fund (RRF − 1) is set at 2.7%.Variable Description
yt Total output
grt⁎ Foreign grants
tO,t Value of natural resource revenue
bt Domestic government debt
dt Concessional government debt
dc,t Commercial foreign government debt
gt
C Government consumption
gt
I Government investment
gt Total government expenditures
gj,t Government expenditures in sector j
pt
G Relative price of government expenditures
νt Share of tradables in government expenditures
~gIt Effective government investment
γGIt Growth rate of government investment
δG,t Depreciation rate of public capital
ft⁎ Resource fund
fin,t Inﬂows in the resource fund
fout,t Outﬂows from the resource fund
gapt Fiscal gap
τtarget,tC Target consumption tax rate
τtarget,tL Target labor income tax rate
gtarget,t
C Target government consumption
ztarget,t Target government transfers
τrule,tC Rule-based consumption tax rate
τrule,tL Rule-based labor income tax rate
grule,t
C Rule-based government consumption
zrule,t Rule-based government transfers
xt Total government debt to GDP ratio
cat
d Current account deﬁcit
Table 2
Baseline calibration.
Parameter Value Deﬁnition Parameter Value Deﬁnition
expshare 0.51 Exports to GDP ρyo 0.90 Persist. of the mining production shock
impshare 0.45 Imports to GDP f 0.50 User fees of public infrastructure
gshare
C 0.14 Govt. consumption to GDP τL 0.05 Labor income tax rate
gshare
I 0.06 Govt. investment to GDP τC 0.10 Consumption tax rate
ishare 0.15 Private investment to GDP τK 0.20 Tax rate on the return on capital
yO,share 0.01 Natural resources to GDP fﬂoor 0 Lower bound for the resource fund
gT,share 0.40 Share of tradables in govt. purchase ù 1 Adjust. share by external commercial debt
cT,share 0.50 Share of tradables in private consumption λ1 1 Adjust. share by consumption tax
RFshare 0.01 Resource fund to GDP λ2 0 Fiscal adjust. share by labor tax
bshare 0.20 Govt. domestic debt to GDP λ3 0 Fiscal adjust. share by govt. consumption
bshare⁎ 0 Private foreign debt to GDP λ4 0 Fiscal adjust. share by transfer
dshare 0.50 Concessional debt to GDP ζ1 0.5 Adjust. speed of consumption tax to target
dc,share 0 Govt. external commercial debt/GDP ζ2 0.001 Consumption tax response to debt/GDP
grshare 0.04 Grants to GDP ζ3 1 Adjust. speed of labor tax to target
(R− 1) 0.10 Domestic net real int. rate ζ4 0 Labor tax response to debt/GDP
(RRF− 1) 0.027 Foreign net real int. rate on savings ζ5 1 Adjust. speed of govt. consumption to target
(Rd− 1) 0 Net real int. rate on concessional debt ζ6 0 Govt. consumption to debt/GDP
(Rf− 1) 0.04 Net real risk-free rate ζ7 1 Adjust. speed of transfer to target
(Rdc,0− 1) 0.06 Net real int. rate on external commercial debt ζ8 0 Transfer response to debt/GDP
ηdc 0 Elast. of sovereign risk gﬂoorC − ∞ Floor on real govt. consumption
αN 0.45 Labor income share in nontraded sector zﬂoor − ∞ Floor on transfer
αT 0.60 Labor income share in traded sector τceilingC + ∞ Ceiling on consumption tax
δN 0.10 Depreciation rate of kN,t τceilingL + ∞ Ceiling on labor income tax
δT 0.10 Depreciation rate of kT,t ν 0.6 Home bias of govet. purchases
ρyT 0.10 Learning by doing in traded sector νg 0.4 Home bias for additional spending
ρzT 0.10 Persist. in TFP in traded sector αG 0.15 Output elast. to public capital
κN 25 Investment adjust. cost, nontraded sector δG 0.07 Depreciation rate of public capital
κT 25 Investment adjust. cost, traded sector ϵ 0.50 Steady-state efﬁciency of public investment
ψ 10 Inverse of Frisch labor elast. gnssI 0.80 Planned long-term scaling up
σ 2.94 Inverse of intertemporal elast. of substitution k1 – Speed of scaling up plan
ρ 1 Intratemporal substitution elast. of labor k2 – Degree of frontloading
ω 0.40 Measure of optimizers in the economy ρδ 0.80 Persist. of deprecia. rate of public capital
χ 0.44 Substitution elast. b/w traded/nontraded goods ϕ 1 Severity of public capital depreciation
η 1 Elast. of portfolio adjust. costs ςε 25 Severity of absorptive capacity constraints
τO 0.65 Royalty tax rate on natural resources γGI 0.75 Threshold of absorptive capacity
ρpo 1 Persist. of the commodity price shock
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Africa (SSA) surveyed in Bufﬁe et al. (2012), the labor income shares
in the nontraded and traded good sectors correspond to αN = 0.45
andαT=0.60, respectively. In both sectors private capital depreciates
at an annual rate of 10% (δN= δT=0.10). Following Berg et al. (2010),
we assume a minor degree of learning-by-doing externality in the
traded good sector ðρYT ¼ ρzT ¼ 0:10Þ. Also as in Berg et al. (2010), in-
vestment adjustment costs are set to κN = κT = 25.
• Households preferences. The coefﬁcient of risk aversion σ= 2.94 im-
plies an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of 0.34, the average
LIDC estimate according to Ogaki et al. (1996). We assume a low
Frisch labor elasticity of 0.10 (ψ = 10), similar to the estimate of
wage elasticity of working in rural Malawi (Goldberg, forthcoming).
The labor mobility parameter ρ is set to 1 (Horvath, 2000), and the
elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods is
χ= 0.44, following Stockman and Tesar (1995). To capture limited
access to international capital markets, we set η = 1 as in Bufﬁe
et al. (2012).18
• Measure of intertemporal optimizing households. Since a large propor-
tion of households in LIDCs are liquidity constrained, we pick ω=
0.40, implying that 60% of households are rule-of-thumb. Depending
on the degree of ﬁnancial development of a country, the measure of
intertemporal optimizing households can be lower than 40% in
some SSA countries. Based on data collected in 2011, Demirguc-18 This implies that perfect arbitrage that equalizes the returns on foreign and domestic
assets breaks down, or no perfect substitutability between foreign and domestic assets.Kunt and Klapper (2012) report that on average only 24% of the adults
in SSA countries have an account in a formal ﬁnancial institution.
• Mining. Resource production shocks are assumed to be persistentwith
ρyo = 0.90. Based on Hamilton's (2009) estimates, we assume re-
source prices follow a random walk so ρpo = 1. The royalty tax rate
τO is set such that the ratio of natural resource revenue to total reve-
nue at the peak of natural resource production is substantial, almost
50% of total revenues. In this case τO = 0.65. When applying the
model to individual countries, the resource tax rate should be cali-
brated to match the share of resource revenue in total revenues in
the data.
• Tax rates and user fees. The steady-state taxes on consumption, labor
and capital are calibrated as τC=0.10, τL=0.15, and τK=0.20, con-
sistent with data collected by the International Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation in 2005–06. This combination of tax rates and the implied
inefﬁciency in revenue mobilization implies a non-resource revenue
of about 18% of GDP at the initial steady state. Following Briceño
Garmendia et al. (2008), we set f = 0.5 in the baseline calibration,
which implies that half of the recurrent cost of public capital is cov-
ered by user fees.
• Fiscal rules. We impose a non-negativity constraint for the resource
fund by setting fﬂoor = 0. In the baseline calibration, ﬁscal instru-
ments do not have ﬂoors or ceilings. This translates in setting, for
instance, gﬂoorC = zﬂoor = −100, 000 and τceilingC = τceilingL =
100, 000 (or some arbitrarily large numbers in absolute values).
The baseline calibration also implies that the whole ﬁscal adjust-
ment takes place through changes in external commercial borrow-
ing and consumption taxes. This is achieved by setting κ= λ1 = 1,
λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0, ζ3 = ζ5 = ζ7 = 1, and ζ4 = ζ6 = ζ8 = 0 in the
639G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649ﬁscal rules. To smooth tax changes, we choose an intermediate
adjustment of the consumption tax rate relative to its target
(ζ1 = 0.5) and a low responsiveness of the consumption tax rate
to the debt-to-GDP ratio (ζ2 = 0.001). The selection of values for
these policy parameters should be guided by the policy scenario
that the user wants to simulate as well as by what she considers
as a feasible ﬁscal adjustment.
• Public investment. Public investment efﬁciency is set to 50% ðϵ ¼ 0:5Þ,
which is in line with Arestoff and Hurlin's Arestoff and Hurlin's (2006)
estimates for developing countries.19 The annual depreciation rate for
public capital is 7% (δG = 0.07). The home biases for government pur-
chases ν and for investment spending above the initial steady-state
level νg are 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. The smaller degree of home bias
in additional spending reﬂects that most of the investment goods are
imported in LIDCs. The output elasticity to public capital αG is set at
0.15, implying amarginal net return of public capital of 28% at the initial
steady state. This is in the high end of the range of returns reported by
Bufﬁe et al. (2012). The severity of public capital depreciation corre-
sponds toϕ=1and the change in the depreciation rate of public capital
is assumed to be persistent by setting ρδ=0.8. In the baseline, absorp-
tive capacity constraints start binding when public investment rises
above 75% from its initial steady state ðγGI ¼ 0:75Þ. The calibration of
absorptive capacity constraints with ςε = 25 implies that the average
investment efﬁciency approximately halves to around 25%when public
investment spikes to around 200% from its initial steady state. For illus-
trative purposes, in the delinked investment approach, we set the
planned long-term scaling up of investment such that public invest-
ment at the new steady state is 80% higher than at the initial steady
state (gnssI = 0.80).4. Scaling up public investment with a resource windfall
The hypothetical scenarios we analyze assume that the economy
discovers a sizable reserve of natural gas, and that production will
reach full capacity several years later.When the shock about the current
or future increases in resource production hits, the responses of the pri-
vate sector begin and continue until the system settles in the new
steady state. The model dynamics are governed by resource shocks, as
well as by exogenously imposed ﬁscal policy paths. Since households
in the model are aware that there are no additional shocks hit in our
simulation, the solutions are equivalent to the perfect-foresight
solution.
With formidable development needs, the government plans to start
investment before resource exploitation is fully in place. To do this, we
assume the government uses the prospected natural resource revenues
as a collateral to borrow commercially, creating challenges to ensure ﬁs-
cal sustainability and macroeconomic stability.
In the baseline scenario, the production of LNG increases gradually,
reaches full capacity by 2021 and then starts to decline after 2035. At
peak, we assume a production of about 1500 millions of cubic feet per
year. For the initial years of simulations, we use the oil price forecast
per barrel available in the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, multi-
plied by the conversion factor for full oil parity (0.1724), which yields
the price in dollars per million of British Thermal Units (BTUs). The pro-
jection of the LNG price in the baseline scenario assumes a non-volatile
path, ﬂuctuating around the mean price. The adverse scenario assumes
that from 2025 onwards, the resource revenue quickly declines, due to
both reduced production quantity and large negative shocks to LNG
prices.19 Other papers such as van der Ploeg (2012) have used the Public Investment Manage-
ment Index (PIMI) of Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) to calibrate these inefﬁciencies.4.1. The spend-as-you-go approach versus the delinked investment
approach
We begin the analysis of policy scenarios by considering two invest-
ment approaches and assuming there is no commercial or domestic bor-
rowing to ﬁnance public investment increases. With the spend-as-you-
go (SAYG) approach, the government spends all of its resource windfall
in public investment each period and the resource fund remains at its
initial steady state, as analyzed in Richmond et al. (2015) for Angola.
Policymakers faced with impoverished population and urgent infra-
structure needs could easily ﬁnd the SAYG approach appealing because
of its immediate increase in investment and output. With the delinked
investment approach, the government combines investment spending
with savings in a resource fund, consistent with the sustainable
investing approach analyzed in Berg et al. (2013). We assume both ap-
proaches resort only to the consumption tax rate to close any ﬁscal gap
by setting λ1 = 1, λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0, ζ1 = ζ3 = ζ5 = ζ7 = 1, and ζ2 =
ζ4 = ζ6 = ζ8 = 0 in the ﬁscal rules.
Figs. 3 and 4 compare the two investment approaches under two re-
source revenue scenarios: the dotted-dashed lines refer to the SAYG ap-
proach and the solid lines correspond to the delinked investment
approach.20 With SAYG, public investment does not increase much be-
cause of the initial low LNG production. With the delinked approach,
public investment scales up gradually with no overshooting (k1 =
0.20, k2 = 0.20). Since the scaling-up is deliberately chosen to be com-
mensurate with the magnitudes of resource revenues, the investment
path does not require a large increase in tax rates.
Themain difference between the two investment approaches is that
the SAYG approach results in a volatile path for public investment,
mirroring the volatility of resource revenue ﬂows. Fiscal volatility is
translated into macroeconomic instability as shown by ﬂuctuations in
macro variables. In contrast, the delinked approach can build up a ﬁscal
buffer and maintain a stable spending path without major ﬁscal adjust-
ments. Comparing the two scenarios of resource revenues, the economy
can build a bigger stabilization fund (of around 150% of GDP) under the
baseline scenario than under the adverse scenario of rapidly declining
resource revenues — it only peaks at around 25% of GDP.
Another concern with the SAYG approach is the reduced public in-
vestment efﬁciency during the years when resource revenue ﬂows ac-
celerate. Sudden accelerations in public investment expenditures
make the economy more prone to bumping into absorptive capacity
constraints, translating into lower efﬁciency. As shown in Fig. 3, with
the SAYG approach, public investment accelerates to an extent that av-
erage investment efﬁciency drops from a baseline value of 50% down to
almost 25%. Also, when public investment signiﬁcantly drops (due to a
sharp decline in the natural resource revenue), failure to maintain pub-
lic capital leads to a higher depreciation rate than the steady-state level.
In the baseline scenario without negative shocks, SAYG can perform
reasonably well as it leads to a higher accumulation of public capital
than the delinked approach. As a result, non-resource output, private
consumption, and investment may reach a higher level than that with
a delinked approach. However, in the presence of negative shocks to
the resource revenue, as captured under the adverse scenario, the
delinked approach performsmuch better, leading to overallmore public
capital, real non-resource output, private consumption, and investment.
Moreover, in both scenarios, a delinked approach delivers a more resil-
ient and stable growth in non-resource GDP and a less volatile real ex-
change rate. The greater real exchange appreciation induced by SAYG
(in periods of particularly high resource revenue) leads to greater20 The numerical simulationswere generated by a set of programswritten inMatlab and
Dynare (see http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare). In all scenarios, we assume perfect
foresight and the simulations track the global nonlinear saddle path. Therefore, themodel
is not log-linearized. Depending on the experiment, the economy may converge to a dif-
ferent steady state from the initial one.
21 The model allows for a ﬂexible arrangement of using various ﬁscal instruments – the
consumption and labor tax rates, government consumption, and transfers to households –
to maintain debt sustainability; see Eqs. (41)–(53). The analysis presented here uses only
the consumption tax rate as an example.
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Fig. 3. Spend-as-you-go vs. delinked investment approach: no additional commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
640 G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649negative learning-by-doing externalities and thus a larger decline in
traded output, implying more severe Dutch disease.
Lastly, the two revenue scenarios assume that the reserve of natural
gas will deplete after 2040, and this has important consequences for
public capital under SAYG. If the public investment level cannot be
maintained (like with SAYG), public capital built with the resource
windfall eventually declines back to the initial steady-state level. Conse-
quently, the growth beneﬁts of more public capital also diminish. Thus,
when determining a scaling-up magnitude, ﬁnancing needs to sustain
capital should be accounted for to ensure long-lasting growth beneﬁts
from a resource windfall.
4.2. Front loading public investment with commercial borrowing
Under the constraints of no additional borrowing, any front-loading
of public investment is not ﬁscally feasible unless the government
chooses to sharply increase taxes (or signiﬁcantly cut non-capital ex-
penditures). In this section, we analyze the effects of a front-loaded in-
vestment path ﬁnanced jointly by resource revenues and commercial
borrowing.
Figs. 5 to 7 compare the public investment effects under different de-
grees of frontloading. All three investment paths eventually reach a
long-run investment level 80% higher than the level in the initial steadystate (k1 = 0.20). The dotted lines represent a conservative path (k2 =
0.10), in which public investment is scaled up slowly enough, so it does
not require signiﬁcant debt accumulation when LNG production is low
initially. The solid lines represent a gradual path (k2 = 0.20) with a
small degree of frontloading. The dashed lines correspond to an aggres-
sive path (k2 = 0.70), which generates a pronounced overshooting of
public investment. During the two peak years, public investment is
around 100% from the initial steady-state level.
In termsof ﬁscal adjustment,we assume that the governmentmakes
use of external commercial borrowing (ϰ= 1) to close the ﬁscal gap
when the resource fund reaches its lower bound. Also, the consumption
tax rate is used as the adjustment instrument that stabilizes debt in the
long run (λ1 = 1).21 Since tax collection in LIDCs is generally weak, we
assume there exists a ceiling for the consumption tax rate at 12.5% and it
is difﬁcult to increase the tax rate bymore that 2.5 percentage points in
the short run.
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Fig. 4. Spend-as-you-go vs. delinked investment approach (continued): no additional commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
641G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649In both resource revenue scenarios (baseline and adverse), front
loading investment results in no savings in the resource fund and rising
public debt. As expected, the debt increase ismost pronouncedwith the
aggressive investment path under the adverse scenario. In contrast,
with either the conservative or gradual path, public debt as a share of
GDP does not increase signiﬁcantly. Also, the increase in the consump-
tion tax rate is smaller than that with the aggressive path. Moreover,
the conservative path is able to accumulate some savings in the resource
fund even under the adverse scenario.
When the economy can resort to external commercial borrow-
ing, front-loading public investment can advance the beneﬁts of
expected resource windfalls, relative to the case with no borrow-
ing. If the degree of front-loading is not excessive and/or the econ-
omy does not experience particularly bad shocks, public debt can
be stabilized despite taxing constraints. In this respect, the model
can serve as a tool to determine a proper front-loading degree
under various assumptions on the rate of return to public capital,ﬁscal policy, and projections of resource revenues. Among the
three investment paths analyzed here, the aggressive path signals
a likely infeasible path because government debt appears to be on
an explosive path under the adverse scenario.4.3. Welfare analysis
In this subsection, we report the intertemporal welfare associated
with the various public investment policies across the baseline and
the adverse scenario of natural resource production and prices. The
intertemporal welfare of the two types of consumers at time t= 0 can
be calculated as
Wi0 ¼ E0
X∞
t¼0
βtU cit ; L
i
t
 ( )
; i ¼ OPT; ROT;
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Fig. 5. Various degrees of investment frontloading: external commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
Table 3
Welfare analysis.
Baseline scenario Adverse scenario
Welfare C.E. % change Welfare C.E. % change
No additional
comm. borr.
SAYG (A) −17.5884 −17.9600
Delinked (B) −17.6663 −0.2672 w.r.t. (A) −17.7887 0.5739 w.r.t. (A)
External comm.
borr.
Conservative (C) −18.0521 −18.1253
Gradual (D) −17.6629 1.2953 w.r.t. (C) −17.7830 1.1349 w.r.t. (C)
Aggressive (E) −17.6587 0.0149 w.r.t. (D) −17.7983 −0.0512 w.r.t. (D)
642 G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649while the aggregate welfare is computed using the shares of the two
types of agents as follows:
W0 ¼ ωWOPT0 þ 1−ωð ÞWROT0 :
Table 3 reports the welfare measure W0. Also, in order to quantita-
tively compare the various welfare outcomes, we compute the
consumption-equivalent (C.E.) welfare change, λ, between, say, policy
(A) and policy (B), implicitly deﬁned as:
WA0 ¼ ωE0
X∞
t¼0
βtU cOPT ;At ; L
OPT;A
t
 ( )
þ 1−ωð ÞE0
X∞
t¼0
βtU cROT;At ; L
ROT;A
t
 ( )
¼ ωE0
X∞
t¼0
βtU λcOPT ;Bt ; L
OPT ;B
t
 ( )
þ 1−ωð ÞE0
X∞
t¼0
βtU λcROT;Bt ; L
ROT ;B
t
 ( )
;
where (λ− 1) × 100 represents the permanent percent change that
should occur to consumption in order for the representative consumer
to be as well off under policy (B) as she is under policy (A).
Our calculations show that, in the case of no additional commercial
borrowing, the delinked approach delivers a welfare loss under thebaseline scenario, but implies awelfare gain (equivalent to a permanent
increase in consumption of more than half a percent) under the adverse
scenario, relative to the SAYG approach. When the government can re-
sort to external commercial borrowing, a gradual approach – a moder-
ate frontloading of public investment – yields a substantial welfare
gain (above 1% in C.E. terms) relative to a conservative approach,
22 Our simulation results appear to favor external commercial borrowing to domestic
borrowing, mainly due to the reduced crowing-out effect with external borrowing. Since
the model only accounts for shocks to resource prices and quantity, it does not capture
the increased vulnerability from a higher stock of external debt resulting from other eco-
nomic shocks. For example, an unexpected shock that depreciates the real exchange rate
would expand the size of foreign liabilities, threatening debt sustainability, as the negative
terms-of-trade shock analyzed in Bufﬁe et al. (2012).
23 To derive this, we combine the ﬁrst order conditions (A.4) and (A.5) in Appendix A.
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Fig. 6. Various degrees of investment frontloading (continued): external commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
643G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649which awaits natural resource revenues to materialize. Under the base-
line scenario, the aggressive approach – a substantial public investment
frontloading – yields a very small welfare gain (0.01% in C.E. terms) rel-
ative to the gradual approach. In the adverse scenario, however, the ag-
gressive investment plan causes a welfare loss. This result is driven by
the anticipation of a higher government debt overhang and the conse-
quent increase in taxes that would occur with an aggressive public in-
vestment policy in the adverse scenario.
4.4. Domestic versus external commercial borrowing
Instead of using external commercial borrowing, the government
can use domestic borrowing to ﬁnance an investment scaling-up.
Fig. 8 compares the macroeconomic effects of the two borrowing strat-
egies (domestic versus external commercial borrowing). The solid lines
refer to domestic borrowing (ϰ= 0), and the dotted-dashed lines re-
ﬂect external borrowing (ϰ = 1). The public investment path is the
same as the aggressive frontloading path depicted in Fig. 5.
The most important difference is that external borrowing brings
in additional ﬁnancial resources, while domestic borrowing shifts
domestic resources away from the private sector into the public sector. Be-
cause of this and the fact that the real interest rate rises more with
domestic borrowing, private investment is crowded out more with
domestic borrowing. And since the amount of domestic borrowing
is higher under the adverse scenario, the crowding-out effect is
more pronounced than that under the baseline scenario. The higher
interest rate associatedwith domestic borrowing also feeds into higher in-
terest payments, more accumulation of public debt, and on average higherconsumption tax rates to stabilize debt. This has important consequences
for debt sustainability under the adverse scenario:With external commer-
cial borrowing public debt remains stable, while with domestic borrowing
public debt becomes unsustainable.22
4.5. The role of limited capital account mobility
In thismodel, optimizing households can save in both domestic gov-
ernment debt and foreign assets. Due to limited capital account mobili-
ty, the two types of assets, however, are not perfect substitutes, as
shown by the modiﬁed interest parity of the model:
Et λtþ1Rtð Þ ¼ Et λtþ1stþ1R

t
st−η b
OPT
t −b
OPT 
2
4
3
5: ð57Þ
23
Since the baseline calibration sets η= 1, the perfect arbitrage be-
tween the two assets breaks down. While households are aware of a
certain investment path and resource revenue at the beginning, private
investment and consumption do not rise immediately to the new
steady-state level because households cannot smooth perfectly in an
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Fig. 7. Various degrees of investment frontloading (concluded): external commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
644 G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649environmentwith restricted access to ﬁnancial markets, and productive
capital does not build up at the beginning to raise productivity of private
production factor immediately.
5. Sensitivity analysis
Among various aspects of themodel, public investment efﬁciency and
the return to public capital are particularly important in shaping themac-
roeconomic effects of public investment. In addition, the degree of
learning-by-doing externalities and its persistence play a crucial role on
Dutch disease or later Dutch vigor.24 In this section,we conduct some sen-
sitivity analysiswith respect to these aspects. Also,we investigatewhether
the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisﬁed by examining the relationship
among the real exchange rate, traded output, and trade balance.
5.1. Public investment efﬁciency, return to public capital, and debt
sustainability
To see how efﬁciency and the return to public capital affect debt sus-
tainability, Fig. 9 compares three different assumptions. The solid lines
reﬂect the baseline calibration (ϵ ¼ 0:5 and αG = 0.15); the dotted-24 Berg et al. (2010) coined the term “Dutch vigor,” as the learning-by-doing externali-
ties cut both ways: increases of traded output relative to its trend can also generate pro-
ductivity gains in this sector and, therefore, amplify the positive effects of resource
revenues, especially over longer horizons.dashed lines assume efﬁciency increases from 0.5 to 0.7 over time;
and the dotted lines correspond to improving efﬁciency together with
αG = 0.18. The ﬁgure is depicted for the case of external commercial
borrowing and the adverse natural resource scenario.
As shown in Fig. 9, improving efﬁciency and/or raising the return to
public capital deliver better macroeconomic outcomes than those from
the baseline calibration. Higher efﬁciency generates more public capital
for a given investment level, which then helps produce more non-
resource output, leading to higher income and, therefore, more
consumption.25 If public capital also becomes more productive, these
positive macroeconomic effects are further ampliﬁed. In the example
provided for the combined changes (dotted lines), the additional
growth rate in non-resource GDP is doubled in the long run.
On the ﬁscal side, government debt is on an explosive path with the
baseline calibration, given the adverse natural resource path. However,
with the efﬁciency improvement, the same investment path turns out to
be ﬁscally sustainable as the additional positive effect on non-resource
GDP growth is capable of generating enough non-resource revenues
that close the ﬁscal gap. The simulations presented here demonstrate
that for the same resource revenue ﬂows and same investment paths,
different investment efﬁciencies and returns to public capital can easily
change the outlook of debt sustainability.25 Because public investment efﬁciency inDIGNAR is time-varying, efﬁciencymatters for
growth outcomes. See Berg et al. (2015a) for somemisconceptions about efﬁciency and its
implications for growth.
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Fig. 8. Domestic vs. external commercial borrowing. X-axis is in years.
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The simulations so far assumeminor learning-by-doing externalities
(ρzT=ρyT=0.1). Studies on learning-by-doing for developed countries,
however, assume a relatively high degree of externalities. Cooper and
Johri (2002), using data of the U.S. manufacturing sector, estimate that
the persistence parameter (similar to our ρzT) is 0.63 and the learning-
by-doing parameter (similar to our ρyT) is 0.37.26 Chang et al. (2002)
allow for permanent learning-by-doing effects via a permanent shock
to technology. Fig. 10 compares the baseline with two alternative cali-
brations on ρzT and ρyT. The case simulated is for external commercial
borrowing under the baseline resource revenue scenario with the
delinked investment path as shown by the solid lines in Fig. 5.
Relative to the baseline (solid lines), stronger leaning-by-doing
(ρzT = 0.1 and ρyT = 0.4, dotted-dashed lines) worsens the initial
Dutch disease slightly but ampliﬁes Dutch vigor substantially later on.
While the TFP of the traded good sector falls slightly, it increases more
than 4% above the trend growth path by 2040, compared to less than26 These estimates are obtained under the assumption that the accumulation of organi-
zation capital and output production have constant returns to scale. Other assumptions,
such as increasing returns to scale in organization capital, are also imposed for estimation.
Overall, the persistent parameter is around 0.5.1%with the baseline calibration. Although the TFP of nontraded produc-
tion is unaffected, higher traded good production increases income and
also the demand for nontraded output. Overall, with stronger learning-
by-doing externalities the non-resource GDP is about 2% higher relative
to the trend-growth path than with the baseline calibration.
To explore the effect of permanent externalities, the dashed lines
represent the case with ρzT = 1 and ρyT = 0.4. With permanent
learning-by-doing externalities, the initial fall in the productivity of
the traded good sector triggers a snowball effect that suppresses the
productivity below the trend-growth path throughout the simulation
horizon. As a result, traded output turns slightly above trend only al-
most 30 years after, because the productivity gain frommore productive
capital is largely offset by the TFP decline due to permanent learning-
by-doing effects.
Fig. 10 demonstrates that the intensity of learning-by-doing plays an
important role in the macroeconomic effects of public investment. Lack
of empirical estimates on the degree of learning-by-doing in developing
countries suggests that sensitivity analysis should be performed. In par-
ticular, our speciﬁcation is symmetric in terms of output changes that
can deteriorate as well as enhance TFP. An overly strong learning-by-
doing assumption (especially ρyT) may depict a very rosy picture
about non-resource output and hence tax revenues, which can poten-
tially underestimate debt sustainability risks.
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27 There are other features that would be interesting to include such as labor informality.
We leave this for future research.
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In addition to learning-by-doing externalities, another dimension
related to the Dutch disease is the extent to which the trade balance
(or traded output) worsens in response to a real appreciation from
investing resource revenues. Under the baseline calibration, the simula-
tion results exhibit a positive correlation between the real exchange
rate and trade balance – real appreciations are accompanied by a dete-
rioration of the trade balance – suggesting the validity of the Marshall–
Lerner condition. Taking a step further, this section investigates how ro-
bust this correlation is in our model with respect to a few key
parameters.
In a simple, small open, New Keynesian model, Galí and Monacelli
(2005) ﬁnd that parameters important for the net export responses to
the real exchange include the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods and the inverse of intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. Thus, Fig. 11 investigates how trade balance and
traded output change when the intratemporal elasticity becomes larger
(χ = 0.44 → 1000, top row) and when the inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of consumption becomes smaller (σ=2.94→ 1, bottom row).
In our model, trade balance dynamics are largely driven by exoge-
nous components, i.e., resource prices, quantities, and the degree of
home bias in public investment (which use both nontraded and traded
goods). Thus, we focus on the endogenous responses of the trade bal-
ance by looking at the differences between the responses of the trade
balance across two parameter settings in each case.
The top row of Fig. 11 shows that, as the degree of intratemporal
elasticity between traded and nontraded goods becomes higher, the
real exchange rate appreciates less. In an extreme case as represented
by dashed lines (χ=1000, nontraded and traded goods are nearly per-
fect substitutes), an initial real appreciation (driven by spending re-
source revenues on public investment) induces households to
substitute away from nontraded to traded goods: the demand pressure
on nontraded goods from higher public investment is largely offset by
the reduced private demand for nontraded goods. In equilibrium, the in-
crease in the trade balance (mainly due to higher resource output and
public investment) matches the increase in the ﬁnancial account bal-
ance (mainly due to higher savings in the resource fund and remittance
of resource dividends to foreign investors). Thus, the real exchange rate
when χ=1000 stays roughly on the steady-state trend growth path. Ahigherχ is associatedwith a smaller real exchange rate appreciation and
an improvement in the trade balance.
The bottom row shows that as the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution for consumption increases (σ goes from 2.94 to 1), the degree of
real appreciation is reduced and trade balance improves. A higher
intertemporal elasticity means that private consumption is more sensi-
tive to real interest rate movements. Anticipating future resource out-
put and higher productive public capital implies that current savings
are expected to be more productive in the future; the real interest rate
must rise to reduce current consumption. The magnitude of such a de-
cline is bigger when σ is smaller (higher elasticity). Since private con-
sumption is composed of both nontraded and traded goods, the
decrease in nontraded good demand of private consumption reduces
the demand pressure of nontraded goods relative to the case of σ =
2.94. Thus, the real exchange rate appreciates less, leading to better per-
formance in traded output. Later as public capital is gradually built up,
the better performance in traded output results in a faster improvement
in the TFP of the traded good sector (due to Dutch vigor) and higher
non-resource output.Withoutmore domestic production, the apprecia-
tion pressure is further reduced relative to the baseline case, generating
further improvements in trade balance, as shown in Fig. 11.
In sum, our baseline simulation results, as well as the sensitivity
analysis on intra- and inter-temporal elasticity of consumption, suggest
that the result that real appreciation leads to a deterioration in the trade
balance is generally robust in our model.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents the DIGNARmodel, which can be used to assess
debt sustainability and growth effects of public investment scaling-ups
in resource-abundant developing countries. The model has most of
the relevant developing country features of the frameworks developed
in Bufﬁe et al. (2012) and Berg et al. (2013), including public investment
inefﬁciencies, absorptive capacity constraints, and learning-by-doing
externalities that can deliver Dutch disease effects.27 It also introduces
novel features especially in the ﬁscal policy structure. DIGNAR can ac-
commodate ﬂexible ﬁscal arrangements, with domestic and external
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medium run, and several ﬁscal instruments (taxes and expenditures
rules) to maintain debt sustainability in the long run. The model also
has a resource fund that can be used as a ﬁscal buffer as well as a saving
device, subject to a minimal saving level that a government intends to
maintain.
To illustrate how to use DIGNAR in policy analysis, the paper cali-
brates the model to an average low-income developing country and
constructs some hypothetical and stylized public investment scaling
up and resource revenue scenarios. It then discusses themacroeconom-
ic effects of different investment approaches – spend-as-you-go and
delinked investment – under different ﬁscal adjustment and borrowing
schemes aswell as the implications of different degrees of public invest-
ment frontloading. The stylized scenarios show that, when ﬁscal adjust-
ment is unconstrained, a delinked public investment approach
combinedwith the resource fund can reducemacroeconomic instability
relative to the spend-as-you-go approach. However, evenwith the fund,
ambitious frontloading public investment plans combined with more
borrowing can induce debt sustainability risks, especiallywith declining
investment efﬁciency or when future resource revenues turn out to be
lower than expected.
The analysis reveals the importance of considering country-speciﬁc
information that can be mapped into parameter values of the model.
When this is not possible for some parameters, sensitivity analysis can
be conducted for these parameters, as the paper shows for the public in-
vestment efﬁciency and the return to public capital under a negative re-
source revenue scenario. Also, the analysis only focuses on two resource
revenue scenarios, but in reality the degree of resource revenue uncer-
tainty can be greater than what is depicted here. One way to address
this issue is to conduct simulations under a wide range of resource rev-
enue scenarios that account for the historical resource price volatility
and likely production proﬁles. The probability of an unfavorable out-
come associated with an investment path can then serve as an indicator
of whether a proposed investment path is overly aggressive (see the
analysis for Angola in Richmond et al., 2015).28
DIGNAR is an integrated model-based macroeconomic framework
that may be useful in constructing the scenarios necessary for debt sus-
tainability analysis of resource-rich developing countries that intend to
scale up public investment. Judgment is still critical to calibrate, con-
struct, and interpret these scenarios. However, DIGNAR can help make
the assumptionsunderlying the projections explicit, organize policy dis-
cussions based on different simulated scenarios, apply empirical infor-
mation, and allow more systematic risk assessments in natural
resource-rich developing countries.
Appendix A. The First order conditions
This appendix consists of the ﬁrst order conditions to the optimiza-
tion problems in the model.
Maximizing the household's total labor income (wtLti = wT,tLT,ti +
wN,tLN,t
i ) subject to aggregate labor (4) yields the following labor sup-
ply schedules for each sector:
LiN;t ¼ δ
wN;t
wt
 	ρ
Lit and L
i
T;t ¼ 1−δð Þ
wT;t
wt
 	ρ
Lit ; for i ¼ OPT;ROT ; ðA:1Þ
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ctOPT, LtOPT, btOPT, and btOPT ⁎
are
λt 1þ τCt
  ¼ cOPTt −σ ; ðA:2Þ28 Berg et al. (2015b) incorporate uncertainty about shocks and parameters more sys-
tematically in a debt sustainability model, while maintaining the non-linear structure, to
construct conﬁdence bands around debt trajectories. A similar approach could in principle
be taken for DIGNAR.κOPT LOPTt
 ψ
¼ λt 1−τLt
 
wt ; ðA:3Þ
λt ¼ βEt λtþ1Rtð Þ; ðA:4Þ
and
λt ¼ βEt λtþ1stþ1R

t
st−η b
OPT
t −b
OPT 
2
4
3
5; ðA:5Þ
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget con-
straint (7).
Let λtqN,t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the law of mo-
tion of capital, where qN,t is the sectoral Tobin's q. Then, the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to LN,t, kN,t, and iN,t are given by
wN;t ¼ αNpN;t
yN;t
LN;t
; ðA:6Þ
qN;t ¼ Et β
λtþ1
λt
1−δNð ÞqN;tþ1 þ 1−τK
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 	 
; ðA:7Þ
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Theﬁrst-order conditionswith respect to LT,t, kT,t, and iT,t are given by
wT ;t ¼ αst
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; ðA:9Þ
qT ;t ¼ Et β
λtþ1
λt
1−δTð ÞqT;tþ1 þ 1−τK
 
1−αTð Þstþ1
yT;tþ1
kT ;t
 	 
; ðA:10Þ
and
1
qT;t
¼ 1− κT
2
iT;t
iT;t−1
−1
 	2
−κT
iT;t
iT;t−1
−1
 	
iT ;t
iT;t−1
" #
þ Et β λtþ1λt κT
qT ;tþ1
qT ;t
iT;tþ1
iT;t
−1
 	
iT;tþ1
iT;t
 	2" #
:
ðA:11Þ
References
Adam, C., Bevan, D., 2006. Aid and the supply side: public investment, export perfor-
mance, and Dutch disease in low-income countries. World Bank Econ. Rev. 20,
261–290.
Adam, C., Bevan, D., 2014. Public investment, public ﬁnance, and growth: the impact of
distortionary taxation, recurrent costs, and incomplete appropriability. IMF Working
Paper 14/73. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Agénor, P.R., 2012. Public Capital, Growth and Welfare: Analytical Foundations for Public
Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Ali, I., Harvie, C., 2013. Oil and economic development: Libya in the post-Gadda era. Econ.
Model. 32, 273–285.
Araujo, J., Li, B.G., Poplawski-Ribeiro, M., Zanna, L.F., 2013. Current account norms in nat-
ural resource rich and capital scarce economies. IMF Working Paper 13/80. Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Arestoff, F., Hurlin, C., 2006. Estimates of government net capital stocks for 26 developing
countries, 1970–2002. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3858,
Washington, D.C.
Barnett, S., Ossowski, R., 2003. Operational Aspects of Fiscal Policy in Oil-Producing Coun-
tries. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Bems, R., de Carvalho Filho, I., 2011. The current account and precautionary savings for
exporters of exhaustible resources. J. Int. Econ. 84, 48–64.
Berg, A., Gottschalk, J., Portillo, R., Zanna, L.F., 2010. Themacroeconomics of medium-term
aid scaling-up scenarios. IMF Working Paper 10/160. International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D.C.
649G. Melina et al. / Economic Modelling 52 (2016) 630–649Berg, A., Portillo, R., Yang, S.C.S., Zanna, L.F., 2013. Public investment in resource-abundant
developing countries. IMF Econ. Rev. 61, 92–129.
Berg, A., Bufﬁe, E.F., Pattillo, C., Portillo, R., Presbitero, A., Zanna, L.F., 2015a. Some miscon-
ceptions about public investment efﬁciency and growth. Manuscript, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Berg, A., Kamenik, O., Wang, H., Zanna, L.F., 2015b. Public investment, growth and debt
sustainability risks in developing economies. Unpublished manuscript, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Berg, A., Yang, S.C.S., Zanna, L.F., 2015. Modeling African economies: a DSGE approach. In:
Monga, C., Lin, J.Y. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics, Volume 1:
Context and Concepts. Oxford University Press, U.K.
Briceño Garmendia, C., Smits, K., Foster, V., 2008. Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Patterns, Issues, and Options. Background Paper 15. Africa Infrastruc-
ture Country Diagnostic, the World Bank.
Bufﬁe, E.F., Berg, A., Pattillo, C., Portillo, R., Zanna, L.F., 2012. Public investment, growth,
and debt sustainability: putting together the pieces. IMF Working Paper 12/144. In-
ternational Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Carrasco, E.R., 1999. The 1980's: the debt crisis and the lost decade of development.
Transnational Law Contemp. Prob 119.
Chang, Y., Gomes, J.F., Schorfheide, F., 2002. Learning-by-doing as a propagation mecha-
nism. Am. Econ. Rev. 92, 1498–1520.
Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C.L., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic ef-
fects of a shock to monetary policy. J. Polit. Econ. 113, 1–45.
Collier, P., van der Ploeg, R., Spence, M., Venables, A.J., 2010. Managing resource revenues
in developing economies. IMF Staff. Pap. 57, 84–118.
Cooper, R., Johri, A., 2002. Learning-by-doing and aggregate ﬂuctuations. J. Monet. Econ.
49, 1539–1566.
Dabla-Norris, E., Jim, B., Kyobe, A., Mills, Z., Papageorgiou, C., 2012. Investing in public in-
vestment: an index of public investment efﬁciency. J. Econ. Growth 17, 235–266.
Davis, J., Ossowski, R., Daniel, J., Barnett, S., 2001. Stabilization and savings funds for non-
renewable resources: experience and ﬁscal policy implications. IMF Occasional Paper
No. 205. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Deléchat, C., Yang, S.C.S., Clark, W., Gupta, P., Kabedi-Mbuyi, M., Koulet-Vickot, M.,
Macario, C., Orav, T., Rosales, M., Tapsoba, R., Zhdankin, D., 2015. Harnessing resource
wealth for inclusive growth in fragile states. IMF Working Paper 15/25. International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Klapper, L., 2012. Measuring ﬁnancial inclusion: the global ﬁndex da-
tabase. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6025.
Dizaji, S.F., 2014. The effects of oil shocks on government expenditures and government
revenues nexus (with an application to Iran's sanctions). Econ. Model. 40, 299–313.
Eaton, J., 2002. The HIPC initiative: The goals, additionality, eligibility, and debt sustain-
ability. Manuscript, Operations Evaluation Department, the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Esfahani, H.S., Ramirez, M.T., 2003. Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth.
J. Dev. Econ. 70, 443–477.
Ferrero, A., Seneca, M., 2015. Notes on the underground:monetary policy in resource-rich
economies. Working Paper 2015/02. Norges Bank.
Galí, J., Monacelli, T., 2005. Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open
economy. Rev. Econ. Stud. 72, 707–734.
Gelb, A.H., 1988. Oil windfalls: blessing or curse? AWorld Bank Research Publication. Ox-
ford University Press, U.K.
Goldberg, J., 2015. Kwacha gonna do? Experimental evidence about labor supply in rural
Malawi. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. (forthcoming).
Gros, D., Mayer, T., 2012. A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess sav-
ings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280. Centre for European Policy Studies (August 28).
Hamdi, H., Sbia, R., 2013. Dynamic relationships between oil revenues, government
spending and economic growth in an oil-dependent economy. Econ. Model. 35,
118–125.
Hamilton, J.D., 2009. Understanding crude oil prices. Energy J. 30, 179–206.
Hjertholm, P., 2003. Theoretical and empirical foundations of HIPC debt sustainability tar-
gets. J. Dev. Stud. 39, 67–100.
Horvath, M., 2000. Sectoral shocks and aggregate ﬂuctuations. J. Monet. Econ. 45, 69–106.
Hulten, C.R., 1996. Infrastructure capital and economic growth: how well you use it may
be more important than how much you have. NBER Working Paper No. 5847.
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 2005. Operational Framework for Debt Sus-
tainability Assessments in Low-Income Countries — Further Considerations. Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and International Development Association, Washington, D. C.Johri, A., Lahiri, A., 2008. Persistent real exchange rates. J. Int. Econ. 76, 223–236.
Krugman, P., 1987. The narrowmoving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive con-
sequences of Mrs Thatcher: notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale econo-
mies. J. Dev. Econ. 27, 41–55.
Levine, P., Melina, G., Yang, S.C.S., Zanna, L.F., 2015. Optimal scaling-up of public invest-
ment in resource-rich low income countries. Manuscript, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, D.C.
Manzano, O., Rigobon, R., 2007. Resource curse or debt overhang. In: Lederman, D.,
Maloney, W.F. (Eds.), Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny. The World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Matsuyama, K., 1992. Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic
growth. J. Econ. Theory 58, 317–334.
Mehrara, M., Oskoui, K.N., 2007. The sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in oil
exporting countries: a comparative study. Econ. Model. 24, 365–379.
Melina, G., Xiong, Y., 2014. Natural resource wealth and public investment strategy: im-
plications for growth and debt. In: Ross, D. (Ed.)Mozambique Rising: Building a
New Tomorrow. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., pp. 141–156.
Minasyan, G., Yang, S.C.S., 2013. Leveraging oil wealth for development in Kazakhstan:
opportunities and challenges. IMF Country Report No. 13/291. International Mone-
tary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Ogaki, M., Ostry, J., Reinhart, C., 1996. Saving behavior in low- and middle-income devel-
oping countries: a comparison. IMF Staff. Pap. 43, 38–71.
Pritchett, L., 2000. The tyranny of concepts: CUDIE (cumulated, depreciated, investment
effort) is not capital. J. Econ. Growth 5, 361–384.
Richmond, C., Yackovlev, I., Yang, S.C.S., 2015. Investing volatile oil revenues in capital-
scarce economies: an application to Angola. Pac. Econ. Rev. 20, 193–221.
Rioja, F.K., 2003. Filling potholes: macroeconomic effects of maintenance versus new in-
vestments in public infrastructure. J. Public Econ. 87, 2281–2304.
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5398.
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 1999. The big push, natural resource booms and growth. J. Dev.
Econ. 59, 43–76.
Satti, S.L., Farooq, A., Loganathan, N., Shahbaz, M., 2014. Empirical evidence on the re-
source curse hypothesis in oil abundant economy. Econ. Model. 42, 421–429.
Schindler, M., 2009. Measuring ﬁnancial integration: a new data set. IMF Staff. Pap. 56,
222–238.
Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2003. Closing small open economy models. J. Int. Econ. 61,
163–185.
Stockman, A.C., Tesar, L.L., 1995. Tastes and technology in a two-country model of the
business cycle: explaining international comovements. Am. Econ. Rev. 85, 168–185.
Stokke, H.E., 2008. Resource boom, productivity growth and real exchange rate dynam-
ics — a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of South Africa. Econ. Model. 25,
148–160.
Torvik, R., 2001. Learning by doing and the Dutch disease. Eur. Econ. Rev. 45, 285–306.
Van den Bremer, T.S., van der Ploeg, F., 2013. Managing and harnessing volatile oil wind-
falls. IMF Econ. Rev. 61, 130–167.
van der Ploeg, F., 2010a. Aggressive oil extraction and precautionary saving: coping with
volatility. J. Public Econ. 94, 421–433.
van der Ploeg, F., 2010b. Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine
savings? Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking. Resour. Energy
Econ. 32, 28–44.
van der Ploeg, F., 2011. Natural resources: curse or blessing? J. Econ. Lit. 49, 366–420.
van der Ploeg, F., 2012. Bottlenecks in ramping up public investment. Int. Tax Public
Financ. 19, 509–538.
van der Ploeg, F., Poelhekke, S., 2009. Volatility and the natural resource curse. Oxf. Econ.
Pap. 61, 727–760.
van der Ploeg, F., Venables, A.J., 2011. Harnessing windfall revenues: optimal policies for
resource-rich developing economies. Econ. J. 121, 1–30.
Venables, A.J., 2010. Resource rents: when to spend and how to save. Int. Tax Public
Financ. 17, 340–356.
Warner, A., 2014. Public investment as an engine of growth. IMF Working Paper 14/148.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
